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Abstract. This article describes psychologies of inevitability and their foundations pertaining to nuclear
weapons and weapons of mass destruction.
During the Cold War, United States (US) national security officials labeled as "hawks" cited the gospel of
a domino theory. In its most radical incarnation, the theory impelled the dire necessity to not only
contain but roll back any Communist initiative anywhere at any time. The consequence of not doing this
would be a succession of successful Communist initiatives (one domino falling after another) eventually
leading to "world victory"--today it would be global victory--for Communism. Often implied in this
theoretical take on the world were other inevitabilities: e.g., (1) uncontesting an initiative or success
always led to a detriment in one's other-perceived prestige and formidability and (2) following any
cooperative venture with a Communist entity always led to others perceiving one to be weak. One
upshot of this theory was the seemingly necessary, inevitable, and disastrous policy decision for the US
Government (USG) to significantly engage Communist forces in Vietnam.
Nowadays, it is a segment of opponents of USG national security officials being accused of setting
dominoes in motion. These opponents of USG initiatives for ballistic missile defense--both theatre and
national--claim that decisions to develop and field such defenses will inevitability lead other nuclear
powers to increase the number and quality of their own nuclear weapons. These opponents also claim
that the USG initiatives also will inevitability lead to non-nuclear political entities with and without
chemical and biological warfare assets developing and/or upgrading missile-borne threats before
ballistic missile defense is fully fielded. As well, they claim that the initiatives will fatally harm USG
relations with allies--this last assertion already becoming disconfirmed by the ongoing discourse of
public diplomacy.
One might posit that domino theories possess and retain part of their attraction by their ready
resolution of an alternative nexus of theories suggesting an unpredictable and even meaningless world.
Unfortunately, such terror management often begets terror through instigating attack, defending no
defense against attack, or other problematic consequences. And so les jeux sont fait. (See Bosman, J.
(1987). Persuasive effects of political metaphors. Metaphor & Symbolic Activity, 2, 97-113; Glad, B., &
Taber, C.S. (1990). Images, learning, and the decision to use force: The domino theory of the United
States. In B. Glad (Ed.). Psychological dimensions of war. (pp. 56-81).Thousand Oaks, CA, US: Sage
Publications, Inc; Gordon, M.R. (March 19, 2001). Bush is due to meet Chinese on crucial Issues. The
New York Times, pp. A1; A8; Kanwisher, N. (1989). Cognitive heuristics and American security policy.
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 33, 652-675; Mio, J.S. (1997). Metaphor and politics. Metaphor & Symbol,
12, 113-133; Shimko, K.L. (1994). Metaphors and foreign policy decision-making. Political Psychology,
15, 655-671.) (Keywords: Dominoes, Inevitability, Nuclear Weapons, Weapons of Mass Destruction.)
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